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WHAT IS THE SOCIAL IN SOCIAL
HISTORY?*
More than a decade after the controversies marking the reception
5of the cultural turn in the anglophone historical community, it is
timely to consider some of the outcomes of the debates of the
1990s. One in particular has been the emergence of ‘cultural his-
tory’ as an important historiographical force, while another has
been the partial eclipse of ‘social history’ — something also appar-
10ent in western European historiography as a whole, often for sim-
ilar reasons.1 Indeed, the kind of influence social history had in
the 1970s and 1980s has passed in good measure to cultural his-
tory. This marks undoubted advances in the discipline; but these
advances have not come without certain costs. What those are, of
15course, is a matter for debate — which, it is to be hoped, will be
encouraged by my version of not only the costs but also the pos-
sibilities of recent historiographical developments. Much of the
1990s’ debate was vigorous and productive. Some of it, though,
was vigorous and unproductive: a matter of opportunities not
20taken. Heat exceeded light, especially when ‘postmodernism’
was taken to spell the end of history as we knew it; and the
chance to consider what actually might be meant by and done
with terms like ‘social’ and ‘cultural’, among the many other
concepts then exfoliating in history, was too often sacrificed to
25the rhetoric of history’s ‘defence’ against the presumed depreda-
*I wish to thank the following for their contributions to the writing of this article,
over the long term and the short: Timothy Mitchell and the wonderful group of post-
graduate students at the International Center for Advanced Studies, New York
University, where I was a Visiting Fellow in 2007 on the programme ‘Rethinking
the Social’; Tony Bennett and Mike Savage, directors of and co-workers in the
Centre for Research in Sociocultural Change, University of Manchester and the
Open University; also Patrick Curry, Simon Gunn, Penny Harvey, Martin Jay,
Chandra Mukerji, Tom Osborne, Chris Otter, Nikolas Rose, William Sewell Jr and
James Vernon. I gave various versions of this article as papers to academic audiences at
the Institute of Historical Research, University of London, Stanford University and
University of California, Berkeley, and my thanks go to the organizers and participants
of these events, including Carla Hesse and Tom Laqueur.
1 For a balanced, long-term account of social history, see Ju¨rgen Kocka, ‘Losses,
Gains and Opportunities: Social History Today’, Jl Social Hist., xxxvii (2003).
Past and Present, no. 205 (Nov. 2009) The Past and Present Society, Oxford, 2009
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tions of postmodernism.2 Now, however, I trust that this account
of some of the changes that have occurred as a consequence of the
cultural turn will elicit discussion that represents an opportunity
taken and not one lost.
5In the 1990s, one of the opportunities that was not taken was a
radical rethinking of the notion of the social itself; this has been
evident even with respect to some of the most thoughtful and
theoretically aware of social history practitioners.3 Instead,
older notions of the social have by and large remained in place:
10as William Sewell describes it, ‘The sense of society as a reified
totality is surely the dominating contemporary usage of the term
both in academic and ordinary language: other meanings have
become decidedly secondary’.4 In Britain this understanding of
‘society’ and the social has commonly been expressed in Marxist
15and Marxist-influenced terms,5 although something similar is
also evident in the more generalized, common-sense view of ‘soci-
ety’ itself as constituting an underlying, structural reality, with the
‘Industrial Revolution’ serving as the classic case of ‘society’ as a
subterranean mechanism of historical transformation. Much of
20this common-sense view was derived from the long-established
and powerful radical-liberal tradition in Britain.6 But the full
2 Some examples of heat exceeding light were Richard J. Evans, In Defence of History
(London, 1997); Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt and Margaret Jacob,Telling theTruthabout
History (New York and London, 1994); Bryan D. Palmer, Descent into Discourse: The
Reification of Language and the Writing of Social History (Philadelphia, 1990).
3 This reluctance characterizes some of the key figures in the debates: for example
Geoff Eley and Keith Nield, The Future of Class in History: What’s Left of the Social?
(Ann Arbor, 2007); Geoff Eley, ACrooked Line: From Cultural History to the History of
Society (Ann Arbor, 2005). From a personal point of view, in the mid 1990s I wrote an
article entitled ‘The End of Social History?’,SocialHist., xx (1995). The fact that there
was a question mark at the end of my title seems to have passed many by at the time,
and some since. But what was a decided critique of then dominant forms of social
history, and an equally decided affirmation of the ‘cultural turn’, was just as much a
call for rethinking the concept of the social and with it new possibilities for social
history itself; it did not advocate doing away with social history.
4 William H. Sewell Jr, Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation
(Chicago, 2005), 322.
5 Richard Johnson, ‘Culture and the Historians’, in John Clarke, Chas Critcher and
Richard Johnson (eds.), Working Class Culture: Studies in History and Theory (London,
1979); Bill Schwarz, ‘‘‘The People’’ in History: The Communist Party Historians’
Group, 1946–56’, in Richard Johnson et al. (eds.),MakingHistories: Studies inHistory-
Writing and Politics (London, 1982); Renato Rosaldo, ‘Celebrating Thompson’s
Heroes: Social Analysis in History and Anthropology’, in Harvey J. Kaye and Keith
McClelland (eds.), E. P. Thompson: Critical Perspectives (Cambridge, 1990).
6 David Sutton, ‘Radical Liberalism, Fabianism and Social History’, in Johnson
et al. (eds.), Making Histories; Raphael Samuel, ‘British Marxist Historians, 1880–1980:
176 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 205
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story is more complex, for Britain’s liberal left was by no means
the sole progenitor of social history in its post-Second World War
forms.7 In the USA the radical-liberal elements were marked too
(though Marxism was more circumscribed), for indigenous intel-
5lectual traditions were more apparent;8 there also the strong
social science influence contributed to similar notions about
‘society’.9
Parallel to this reluctance to confront the foundational concept
of social history has been a similar neglect of the concept of ‘cul-
10ture’ in the term ‘cultural history’. An often uncritical embrace of
cultural history has meant that as it has become increasingly
influential a certain routinization has set in: intellectual edges
that once cut have become blunt with habitual use. Indeed,
much the same kind of thing was apparent in social history in
15its day. Nonetheless, what social history at its best did have —
and what has been increasingly lost to view in subsequent
developments — was a critical engagement with theory as well
as with other disciplines, especially the social sciences; it in fact
actively helped to theorize and politicize (in varying degrees) the
20approaches of those disciplines. Social history’s openness to
ideas was evident in, for example, the reception and influence
of European Marxism, Annales history, and American social
science.10 Indeed social history, in attempting to get beyond the
narrowness of established political and economic historical un-
25derstandings, was challenging and innovative, carrying a political
energy because it took up the big theoretical and political ques-
tions of its time in a particularly urgent way.
(n. 6 cont.)
Part One’, New Left Rev., cxx (1980), esp. 31–42; Peter Clarke, Liberals and Social
Democrats (Cambridge, 1978); Eric J. Hobsbawm, ‘The Fabians Reconsidered’, in his
LabouringMan: Studies in theHistory of Labour (London, 1964); Patrick Joyce,Democratic
Subjects:TheSelfand theSocial inNineteenth-CenturyEngland (Cambridge,1984),153–61;
Richard Johnson, ‘Edward Thompson, Eugene Genovese, and Socialist-Humanist
History’, History Workshop, no. 6 (1978).
7 Miles Taylor, ‘The Beginnings of Modern British Social History?’, History
Workshop Jl, no. 43 (1997).
8 Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The ‘Objectivity Question’ and the American
Historical Profession (Cambridge, 1988).
9 See the account in Sewell, Logics of History, ch. 2, esp. 25–40.
10 For works onAnnalespublished at the time, see, for example, Traian Stoianovich,
FrenchHistoricalMethod: The Annales Paradigm (Ithaca, 1976);ANewKind of History:
From the Writings of Febvre, ed. Peter Burke, trans. K. Folca (London, 1973).
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Whether this can still be said of cultural history is open to ques-
tion. The traditional concerns of social history — questions of
class, the state and the economic — have been largely eclipsed;
but equally lost has been the very idea that the adjective in ‘social
5history’ is itself of the utmost importance as a matter of continu-
ous theoretical inquiry and, just as much, of political concern.
Now, this appears to have happened with the adjective in ‘cultural
history’ as well. The significance of these adjectives cannot be
simply taken for granted, as currently seems so often the case.
10By comparison with the early days of social history in the 1960s
and 1970s, and with the vigorous and theoretically charged dis-
agreement that marked the cultural turn in the 1990s and earlier,
a certain degree of complacency is apparent and theoretical liter-
acy has declined. Yet, just as the possibilities for social history
15have changed over recent times, so, in the human sciences, have
those for theory itself. And as the nature of the political itself has
changed, so have the possibilities for a more politically charged
history; this is a topic to which I return in my concluding section.
In terms of theory within the social sciences, there has been a
20veritable explosion in recent years, producing a multiplicity not
only of different theories but also of intellectual ‘turns’. This has
been marked in parallel by a shift away from conceptions of theory
in which the test of a theory has been its generalizability. In place
of that, theory as the´orie concre`te has emerged. For instance, in
25current anthropology the earlier ‘scientific’ understanding of
theory has been superseded by (to quote Martin Holbraad) a
recognition of ‘the reciprocal effect upon theory that ethnography
has to offer’; so that what is at issue is not ‘a theory’s extension
over ethnographic data, but the data’s capacity to extend our the-
30oretical imagination’. The aim is therefore one of ‘intensively
transforming analytical concepts as opposed to applying them
to data’.11 On the face of it, this view of theory should be
11 Martin Holbraad, ‘The Power of Powder: Multiplicity and Motion in the
Divinatory Cosmology of Cuban Ifa (or Mana Again)’, in Amiria Henare, Martin
Holbraad and Sari Wastell (eds.), Thinking Through Things: Theorising Artefacts
Ethnographically (London, 2007), 190. The volume as a whole represents a powerful
exploration of the sorts of dialectic involved in developing the´orie concre`te: the editors,
in a nicely literal sense of concrete, elevate ‘things’ themselves to a critical place in the
generation of theory, and in the process put in question the distinction between the
theory of anthropology’s practitioners and its subjects of inquiry. Taking issue with
Bruno Latour (see n. 43 below), they excavate the nature of ontology itself, showing
how the local and particular can serve to reshape the fundamentals of theory — in this
178 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 205
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congenial to historians, whose experience of the archive is analo-
gous to anthropologists’ experience of the field and fieldwork.12
Both disciplines have a broadly ethnographic interest in the con-
crete and the particular, and in the capacity of these concerns
5themselves to refashion theory more in their image than has pre-
viously been the case.
Of course, there have been important exceptions to the general
quiet on the theoretical and political fronts that has prevailed in
recent times; notably Sewell’s recent book Logics of History13
10argues for the renewal of social history, and for a new dialogue
between history and the social sciences — one that attends to new
understandings of the social precisely in order to make the big
questions of our time come more fully into the purview of social
and cultural history — above all in its argument about the nature
15and genesis of contemporary capitalism.14 To Sewell’s concern
with capitalism may be added a parallel concern with the political,
in particular the nature and genesis of contemporary governance,
especially in its liberal and neo-liberal forms.15 Among other
(n. 11 cont.)
case their powerful claim that we live in a world of many ontologies as well as many
epistemologies. Their claim is that their methodology proposes how ‘things’ may
dictate a plurality of ontologies; whereas Latour offers only a two-dimensional ‘new
meta-theory whereby the inclusion of non-human/human hybrids portrays everything
as a network of entities that breach the object/subject divide’. Henare, Holbraad and
Wastell (eds.),Thinking through Things, 7 (editors’ intro.) There is much for historians
to consider in this anthropological work.
12 Thomas Osborne, ‘The Ordinariness of the Archive’, History of the Human
Sciences, xii, 2 (1999), 58.
13 Sewell, Logics of History, esp. ch. 10, ‘Refiguring the ‘‘Social’’ in Social Science:
An Interpretavist Manifesto’. But, while his reading of the social and the material in
this chapter is of great value, nonetheless it is essentially a semiotic one, partaking still
of the conceptual dualisms argued against here: see ibid., 363–9 (where, however
much ‘language’ and the ‘built environment’ may be ‘dialectically’ related, they do
in the end make up another version of the familiar distinction between language and
materiality).
14 Ibid., 77. At the same time as history has drifted away from the social sciences,
large areas of the social sciences, at least in the anglophone world, have, for a variety of
reasons, including the cultural turn itself, abandoned much of the historical awareness
that characterized them in the 1960s and 1970s. The particular US context is signifi-
cant; Sewell’s book for instance needs to be understood in the context of US sociology:
it serves as a powerful riposte to a predominating ahistorical positivism, often in the
form of rational-choice theory. In British social science, with notable exceptions,
history very often serves as a vague and off-the-peg ‘background’ to a resolute
presentism.
15 Nikolas Rose, Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (Cambridge, 1999);
Nikolas Rose,ThePolitics of Life Itself: Biomedicine, Power, andSubjectivity in theTwenty-
First Century (Princeton, 2007); Patrick Joyce, The Rule of Freedom: Liberalism and the
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recent works in this vein, Victoria Bonnell and Lynn Hunt’s col-
lection, Beyond the Cultural Turn, offers a criticism of cultural
history for neglecting social dimensions — though it must be
said that the editors themselves offer scant consideration of the
5concept of the social.16 And a recent survey of cultural history on
the British side by Peter Mandler has rightly been criticized for its
confusion of cultural history with a narrowly understood version
of textuality; but neither Mandler nor his critics pay any attention
to the concept of the social.17 This is also the case in the work of
10Gareth Stedman Jones, where a Cambridge School-influenced
‘linguistic approach’ to the then emerging concerns of cultural
history served further to compound the association of cultural
history with ‘discourse’ — hence narrowing its remit and cutting
it off further from the social sciences and questions about the
15nature of the social.18
Now, there are significant differences in the various national
takes on social and cultural history (as Sewell’s book itself indi-
cates), even if it is the underlying similarities between the US and
UK cases that are striking, certainly by comparison with the
20French.19 Consequently, both the variety and the amorphous
(n. 15 cont.)
Modern City (London, 2003): see also Tony Bennett, Francis Dodsworth and Patrick
Joyce (eds.), ‘Liberalisms, Government, Culture’, special issue ofCultural Studies, xxi,
4–5 (2007), intro. and articles.
16 Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt (eds.), Beyond the Cultural Turn: New
Directions in the Study of Society and Culture (Berkeley, 1999).
17 For critiques of Mandler’s parochial take on cultural history, see the various
contributions to ‘Debate Forum’, Cultural and Social Hist., i, 2 (2004), especially
those of Carla Hesse, ‘The New Empiricism’, and Colin Jones, ‘Peter Mandler’s
‘‘Problem with Cultural History’’: or, Is Playtime Over?’. For Mandler’s original
article, see Peter Mandler, ‘The Problem with Cultural History’, Cultural and Social
Hist., i, 1 (2004).
18 Gareth Stedman Jones, ‘The Determinist Fix: Some Obstacles to the Further
Development of the Linguistic Approach to History in the 1990s’,HistoryWorkshop Jl,
no. 42 (1996). For a critique of Stedman Jones and his anti-Foucault return to
a narrow linguistic model, see Miguel A. Cabrera, ‘Linguistic Approach or Return
to Subjectivism? In Search of an Alternative to Social History’, Social Hist., xxiv
(1999).
19 Sewell gives a good account of these national distinctions, including the French:
Sewell, Logics of History, ch. 2. In Italy cultural history has developed only fairly
recently, and its historians are therefore in a position to avoid some of the turnings
that cultural history has taken elsewhere. See the website of the Centre for Cultural
History, based in the University of Padua, and including the universities of Bologna,
Venice and Pisa — Il Centro Interuniversitario di Storia Culturale: 5http://
www.centrostoriaculturale.storia.unipd.it4.
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nature of social and cultural history must be borne in mind.
However, while it is necessary to acknowledge this,20 there are
enough similarities across national cases to suggest that the pic-
ture of current disciplinary configurations presented below is a
5credible generalization.21 On the other hand, it is less the current
state of play that is of concern here than some possible ways for-
ward. Therefore, in order to engage with current disciplinary
frameworks in a productive way, this article proceeds in the fol-
lowing manner. First, there is a brief consideration of some of the
10uses and limitations of the concept of culture in cultural/social
history. Secondly, recent understandings of the social which may
be of value for social and cultural history alike are examined in a
theoretical and then historiographical manner. This consider-
ation of the social leads in turn to discussion of recent under-
15standings of power, particularly how these relate to the nature
of materiality and of the material world — for it is the case that
the inclusion of materiality in our thinking about the social is
crucially important, and, in fact, it might be said that as well as
the cultural turn itself there has been something like a ‘material
20turn’ in recent times. (This might indeed be the most significant
of all recent ‘turns’, in so far as it can be distinguished from the
‘cultural turn’ generally, which is doubtful.) Thirdly, as a conse-
quence of considering the social it will become apparent that the
history of power and of the political is intrinsic to an adequate
25understanding of the social; so in the last main section the subject
of the state provides a setting in which the theoretical positions
developed earlier can be realized, however briefly, in an empirical
and historical way.
20 For an account of recent ‘cultural history’ works that have been undoubtedly
innovative, see Colin Jones on Peter Mandler, n. 17 above. It may be noted that a
number of these works draw upon the historiographical and theoretical influences
which I advocate here.
21 That it is so is further suggested by the recent presidential address to the
American Historical Association given by the historian Gabrielle M. Spiegel. In
this, while the engagement with theory is real enough, the cultural turn is reduced
to a linguistic interpretation so that history comes in this account to be overwhelmingly
associated with matters of meaning and representation. Gabrielle M. Spiegel,
‘Presidential Address: The Task of the Historian’, Amer. Hist. Rev., cxiv (2009). It is
also suggested by Kocka, ‘Losses, Gains and Opportunities’.
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I
CULTURE
In their usual eclectic and utilitarian way,22 historians have often
been uncritical and passive in importing concepts borrowed from
5other disciplines, while history in its turn has insufficiently con-
tributed its particular kinds of understanding to these disci-
plines.23 One consequence has been the indiscriminate merging
together of culture and the social, as for instance in the increas-
ingly frequent use of the category ‘cultural and social history’,
10where adjectival addition adds nothing to our understanding.
The very distinction between the two — and the concomitant,
frequently heard affirmation that ‘culture’ is implicated in the
make-up of ‘social’ relationships — indicates that large parts of
cultural/social history have not moved beyond the familiar
15mainstream binary thinking of much social science. In this under-
standing, metaphors of ‘construction’ and ‘constitution’ abound,
signifying the purchase from the social sciences of loosely con-
ceived concepts of social or cultural construction. What is con-
structed is primarily ‘identity’, something that has become a
20defining concern of cultural history.24 Consonant with the pre-
dominating emphasis on meaning and representation, the agents
of change in cultural history are frequently understood to be
beliefs, meanings or narratives — agents which are often indis-
tinct in their formulation and in their perceived historical opera-
25tion. The more ‘linguistic’ the version of the cultural turn that is
taken, the more this is the case.25
In fact (as the historical sociologist Richard Biernacki has
shown), in its employment of the category of culture, cultural
history has done something very similar to what social history
30did earlier: it has simply ontologized the cultural, just as social
22 As described very well in Sewell, Logics of History, 1–6, 12–18.
23 See Sewell’s very pertinent recommendation that social scientists might learn
from historians (rather than the other way around), were historians to articulate
more conceptually their rich but largely implicit and unspoken understandings of
temporality: ibid., 6–12.
24 See Frederick Cooper, with Rogers Brubaker, ‘Identity’, in Frederick Cooper,
Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley, 2005), for a discussion
of the shortcomings of some of the identity approaches.
25 Tony Bennett, ‘Making Culture, Changing Society: The Perspective of ‘‘Culture
Studies’’’, in Bennett, Dodsworth and Joyce (eds.), ‘Liberalisms, Government,
Culture’, special issue of Cultural Studies; Tony Bennett, Culture: A Reformer’s
Science (London, 1998).
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historians ontologized the social.26 ‘Culture’ has thus become
a new sort of foundational category, something that involves
buying into precisely the same set of binary oppositions existing
within the old concept of society which it purported to reject.
5Timothy Mitchell’s recent book presents a similar argument,
examining how the cultural turn is often held to mark a distance
from the systematic social sciences.27 Yet, in practice this empha-
sis on culture has often left the older kinds of social science
untouched, since it has failed to contest the territory on which
10they were established. Demonstrating that everything social is
cultural left on one side ‘the existence of the other spheres, the
remainder or excess that the work of social construction works
upon — the real, the natural, the nonhuman’.28 Insisting on the
centrality of the cultural tacitly recognizes that the material, and
15the economic in particular, are separate entities; or, otherwise, it
removes the material and the economic from the scope of discus-
sion and relegates from history altogether. Purely culturalist
understandings of the cultural turn, as Mitchell argues,
intentionally or not, depend upon maintaining the absolute difference
20between representations and the world they represent, social construc-
tions and the reality they construct. Maintaining these distinctions there-
fore leaves ‘hard’ social scientists (like economists) undisturbed, for they
can point out they are not concerned with the history of representations
but with the underlying reality their models represent.29
25From a similar perspective, Tony Bennett has recently argued
that differences between culture, economy and society are not
ontological but historical, and that what he calls ‘public’ is a
matter of power and its articulation by institutions.30 What all
26 Richard Biernacki, ‘Method and Metaphor after the New Cultural History’, in
Bonnell and Hunt (eds.) Beyond the Cultural Turn.
27 Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity (Berkeley,
2002), 2–3.
28 Ibid., 2.
29 Ibid., 4–6.
30 Bennett, ‘Making Culture, Changing Society’, and intro. in Bennett, Dodsworth
and Joyce (eds.), ‘Liberalisms, Government, Culture’, special issue ofCultural Studies.
In the task of exploring the history of the differentiation of categories — in this case the
social — clear distinctions need to be drawn between different historical and analytical
orientations to the social in the usage made of the terms by historians and sociologists.
Bennett’s understanding of the differentiation of ‘culture’, of course entirely legiti-
mate, is shaped by a notion of the social as it emerged in the course of the eighteenth
century, and especially as this has been articulated by Foucault and his account of the
Classical Age. Historians, as opposed to, say, sociologists, might have a range of
different understandings of the social, depending on which one is in question. See
the various contributions to Patrick Joyce (ed.),The Social inQuestion:NewBearings in
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this strongly suggests is that a major task of historians is to chart
the process whereby culture, economy and society emerged and
differentiated themselves one from another — and also, it should
be added, from the political.31 Consequently, the tendency in
5cultural history to work with the separations and distinctions
that Mitchell discusses as if they are historical givens can be
seen as particularly ironic, for these distinctions themselves
have an ineradicably historical and social form. The powers that
this separation of things and representations serves, therefore, are
10themselves political, governmental and indeed academic, which
means they are inscribed in different ways in academic disciplines
as a widespread and very powerful intellectual inheritance, and
are in fact part of academic common sense. Thus tracing the
history of things and ideas, of representation and the material,
15inevitably involves self-awareness of their inscription in the his-
tory of disciplinary practice.
Meanwhile, cultural history goes on working with the old and
unhelpful conceptual apparatus: on the one hand lumping cul-
ture and the social together (and in numerous versions conceiving
20of culture and the social as both made up of organized structures of
meaning); and on the other, in contradictory fashion, differentiat-
ing the two as being composed of different things (as will already
have become apparent in the discussion of the cultural/social his-
tory distinction itself). There remains a powerful understanding
25of cultural history as essentially about representations, and thus in
some sense primarily about ‘texts’, which if not exclusively verbal
are mainly so. By the same token, social history is presumably
(n. 30 cont.)
History and the Social Sciences (London, 2002), especially that of Catherine Pickstock,
who traces the emergence of one form of the social as early as the theology of Duns
Scotus: Catherine Pickstock, ‘The Mediaeval Origins of Civil Society’.
31 Mary Poovey has been of critical significance in accounting for processes of
differentiation, as of course have many historians of science and technology: Mary
Poovey,AHistory of theModern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences ofWealth and
Society (Chicago, 1998); Mary Poovey, Making a Social Body: British Cultural
Formation, 1830–1864 (Chicago, 1995). See also her recent Genres of the Credit
Economy: Mediating Value in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Britain (Chicago,
2008). Having in earlier work attended to the emergence of the ‘modern fact’ in
relation to the elaboration of a distinct sphere of the economy and the economic,
particularly in relation to political economy, in this latest book Poovey switches her
attention to the accelerating differentiation of that which is not fact — namely the
fancy and the imagination. See the discussion of this work, by Patrick Joyce and others,
forthcoming in Jl Cultural Econ.
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about that which is not representation — though it is not clear
what that is. This contradictory understanding of culture/the
social is apparent, for example, in Bonnell and Hunt’s Beyond
the Cultural Turn, where the familiar oxymoron of several schol-
5arly literatures is once again employed, with so-called ‘material
culture’ being seen as one of the ‘arenas in which culture and
social life most obviously and significantly intersect, where cul-
ture takes concrete form and these concrete forms make cultural
codes most explicit’.32 As Chris Otter observes, in this reading,
10‘Matter is where immaterial culture materializes: its only purpose
is to mean. Outside of these meanings, it has no history whatso-
ever’.33 This way of looking at things — meanings and represen-
tations on the one side, and materiality and social relations on the
other — therefore presents us once again with the replication of
15that division of the world which the cultural turn originally set out
to counter. Such a division represents a serious impediment to
new and productive forms of history.
II
THE SOCIAL
20Whatever the neglect of the concept of the social in cultural his-
tory (and to some degree in social history too), it is difficult to
avoid it. As Keith Baker’s brief but brilliant history of the social
argues, in Western culture since at least the eighteenth century the
concepts of the social and of society have replaced religion as what
25he calls ‘the ultimate ground of order’, and the ‘underlying gen-
eralized ontological signification of the totality of complex inter-
relatedness that we understand as constituting the basic reality
of human existence’.34 ‘History’ has provided a similar ontolog-
ical ground, just as in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
30the social accrued to itself ‘laws’ which explained the grounds
32 Bonnell and Hunt (eds.), Beyond the Cultural Turn, 11 (editors’ intro.).
33 Chris Otter, ‘From the Social to the Collective: Writing Posthumanist British
History’, unpubd seminar paper.
34 Keith M. Baker, ‘Enlightenment and the Institution of Society: Notes for a
Conceptual History’, in Willem Melching and Wyger Velema (eds.), Main Trends in
Cultural History (Amsterdam and Atlanta, 1994); and see the utilization of Baker’s
argument in Joyce (ed.),Social inQuestion, editor’s intro.; also Sewell,Logics ofHistory,
321–8.
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of order. ‘Culture’ has also stood for the symbolically constituted
ground of human existence, especially in anthropology; and so,
latterly, has language.35 Now, as Sewell observes, the social is not
only ambiguous and polysemous, but also peculiarly vague and
5indeed mysterious. This is perhaps related to its emergence out of
a framework of religion, something which may also be connected
with its distinctive inclusiveness and its durability. It still tends to
subsume the historical, the cultural and language: but when it is
juxtaposed to those terms this subsuming is much qualified or
10negated. Therefore, the ambiguity and vagueness of the social do
not make the term vacuous. On the contrary, it is replete with
meanings, going back beyond the Enlightenment to at least the
Reformation.36 And it is, indeed, the very fullness and sugges-
tiveness of its meanings that makes its use so necessary — even
15unavoidable.
Thus it is that the social stands in need of constant theoreti-
cal scrutiny and reinterpretation. This scrutiny need not begin
de novo; it has, first, the long tradition of social history itself
to draw upon. As Thomas Osborne remarks, ‘One might argue
20. . . that the notion of the social for social historians themselves
was never a fixed category (invoking hard and fast philosophies of
history); its use was always in its malleability and its promiscu-
ity’.37 Even if the social history tradition has in part ossified, its
record of engagements between theory and practice (the´orie con-
25cre`te indeed) remains to be employed. That is one route to
rethinking the social. The route taken here, however, is a consid-
eration of the nature of ‘the social’ as it has recently emerged in
certain key developments in the social sciences — and the obvious
place to begin is with social theory. Here, for many years, scholars
30have been attempting to arrive at new understandings of the social
which overcome the dualisms that have bedevilled the social
sciences, and which still form a great deal of their disciplinary
common sense. In this attempt, what may in general be called
the processual (as opposed to structural) understandings of the
35social that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s have in turn given
35 Sewell, Logics of History, 326.
36 Baker, ‘Enlightenment and the Institution of Society’, passim; Pickstock,
‘Mediaeval Origins of Civil Society’.
37 Thomas Osborne, ‘History, Theory, Disciplinarity’, in Joyce (ed.), Social in
Question, 77.
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rise to new concepts and analytical tools.38 In Britain there has
been the development of a ‘post-societal sociology’, one that in
dispensing with the notion of ‘society’ as a reification is attentive
to the mutable, to the provisional, and to practice — both in terms
5of what it sets out to explain in the world, and in the character of
the sorts of explanations it offers.39
This serves as a critique of orthodox notions of the dualisms of
structure and agency, of structure and culture, and obviously of
‘society’ and ‘culture’ even in their dialectical forms. Consequent
10upon the major ‘turn’ of the cultural, there has (in the USA as well
as in Britain) been a series of what might be called secondary
‘turns’ — ‘empirical’, ‘affective’, ‘descriptive’ and so on — which
all to one degree or another build upon and develop this critique,
seeking in the process to ‘move beyond documentary positivism,
15simplistic notions of causality, and quasi-philosophical social the-
ories of change’.40 To simplify greatly, there are two principal
aspects of these complex intellectual currents. The first is related
to questions of agency, and the second to questions of phenom-
enology, to modes of being in the world — a good deal of which is
20summed up in the term ‘affect’. ‘Affect’ has registered as much
and probably more in the humanities than in the social sciences.
The sociologist Nigel Thrift recently defined ‘affect’ as denoting
an approach that attempts to capture the ‘onflow’ of everyday life
by attending to the biological and the precognitive rather than
25to consciousness.41 In the light of this, ‘affect’ can be seen as
38 In the terms of Zygmunt Bauman, for example, these include concepts like ‘soci-
ality’, which unlike ‘society’ aim to encompass the fluidity and liquidity of social
formations in the modern world: Zygmunt Bauman, Intimations of Postmodernity
(London, 1992), 39–42, 53–7, 189–93. The line of thinkers in this enterprise is
long and very diverse: for example, the work not only of Bauman but of Giddens,
Touraine and Bourdieu, among others. For a consideration of this intellectual sea
change in relation to class and the social, see the Oxford reader, Class, ed. Patrick
Joyce (Oxford, 1995).
39 John Urry, ‘Introduction’ and ‘Conclusion’ to ‘Sociology Facing the Next
Millennium’, special issue of Brit. Jl Sociology, li, 1 (2000). See also the other con-
tributions in this issue.
40 See, especially, the anniversary issue of the British Sociological Review, lvi (2008),
including the editors’ introduction: Tom Osborne, Nikolas Rose and Mike Savage,
‘Introduction: Inscribing the History of British Sociology’, quotation at p. 9. The issue
represents what might be called the ‘descriptive term’, in which there is a shift from
emphasizing causality to description itself. See also Patricia Ticineto Clough (ed.)The
Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social (Durham, NC, 2007).
41 Nigel Thrift, Non-Representational Theory: Space, Politics, and Affect (London,
2007), appendices 5–6.
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concerned with practices, conceived of as corporeal routines
stable enough to reproduce themselves over time. These practices
and routines are inseparable from the material practices and
things through which they are brought into being, above all in
5contemporary life in mass consumer capitalism.42 Obviously,
questions about agency are closely related to this: agency is
opened to new perspectives when the precognitive realm of emo-
tions and states-of-being more generally are understood in terms
that deny traditional dualistic ontologies. The title of Thrift’s
10book, Non-Representational Theory, indicates clearly enough
the common drift of both approaches: post-humanist, anti-
individualist, relational, and hence concerned with moving the
agenda of inquiry beyond questions of meaning and representa-
tion, at least as these are presently understood. Nonetheless, the
15relevance of theories of ‘affect’ to many of the traditional concerns
of cultural history will be apparent.
The interest in agency owes much to the work of Bruno
Latour,43 although his work is only one of the influences involved
in the ‘science studies’ agenda that has been so important.44
20Because this approach is more directly concerned with the
nature of materiality, because it so directly engages with the
nature of the social, and because questions of agency are so per-
tinent to historical writing, I concentrate on this aspect more than
on the phenomenological. The crucial intellectual move regard-
25ing agency and the social is one that moves away from notions of
a coherent social totality, towards the erasure of familiar concep-
tual distinctions between the natural and the social, the human
42 Ibid., 5–18.
43 Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory
(Oxford, 2005). Also, Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine
Porter (Hemel Hempstead, 1993); Bruno Latour,Pandora’sHope: Essays on theReality
of Science Studies (Cambridge, Mass., 1999); Bruno Latour, ‘When Things Strike
Back: A Possible Contribution of ‘‘Science Studies’’ to the Social Sciences’, in Brit.
Jl Sociology, li, 1 (2000); Bruno Latour, ‘Gabriel Tarde and the End of the Social’, in
Joyce (ed.), Social in Question.
44 This line of thinking runs from Foucault and Deleuze through to actor-network
theory, and post-constructivist science studies, including Latour, Michel Callon and
John Law. In John Law’s account of modernity he draws on the work of his colleague
Bruno Latour, who locates the arbitrary division of the world historically in terms of
modernity itself. In turn, in hisWeHaveNeverBeenModern, Latour is heavily indebted
to a classical work in the history of science and technology, namely Steven Shapin and
Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life
(Princeton, 1985). See John Law,OrganizingModernity: SocialOrder andSocial Theory
(Oxford, 1993).
188 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 205
K:/Journals/Inprocess/Oup/Pastj/gtp030.3d [13.10.2009–9:29am] [175–
210] Paper: gtp030
MANUSCRIPT CATEGORY: ORIGINAL PAPER
and the non-human, and the material and the cultural — divisions
that are all in the first place predicated on the immaterial/material
divide. The social, in this intellectual departure, is seen to be
performed by material things just as much as by humans, so
5that labelling one thing a person and another a machine, or one
thing material and another thing not, is not a given in the order of
things but is itself a product of the ordering of people and things
that make up ‘the social’ in the first place. The general idea here,
therefore, is that the social does not lie outside the actors and
10networks in which it is located (in ‘society’ or ‘nature’, say).
Thus ‘society’ is seen to be radically contingent rather than
necessary — an interpretation marked by a keen apprehension
of the difficulty and complexity of achieving order. The social and
society are viewed in terms of the ‘path building’ and ‘order
15making’ of the networks and the actants involved (the latter is a
better word than actors for describing non-human as well as
human elements).45 The task of analysis involves following the
actants and the networks themselves, particularly those that
become ‘strategic’ because of the number of connections they
20make possible in a highly contingent world.
One way of elucidating this further is by employing spatial
metaphors: thus Latour writes about a ‘flat’ social, instead of
received understandings of a surface/depth one.46 It is the latter
that still suffuse common sense and much of academic usage:
25when we talk, for instance, of the ‘social context’ or the social
setting or the social ground of something, and above all when
we speak about notions of ‘social construction’. But ‘social con-
text’ is meaningless when the distinction between text and con-
text is dissolved, as it is here; and ‘social construction’ is equally
30meaningless because it automatically presupposes a distinction
between what is and what is not the social (the latter in practice
usually meaning the material). Similarly, still prevalent if often
unacknowledged notions of the social as akin to either a structure
or an organism are undermined. For, in this ‘flat’ social, forms of
35addressing the social that are part of disciplinary common sense
(such as foreground and background, figure and context, actor
and system, and hence micro and macro) are all dissolved.
45 This paragraph draws on John Frow, ‘Matter and Materialism: A Brief Prehistory
of the Present’, in Tony Bennett and Patrick Joyce (eds.), Material Powers: Cultural
Studies, History and the Material Turn, Routledge, forthcoming.
46 Bruno Latour, ‘How to Keep the Social Flat’, in his Reassembling the Social.
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Historical outcomes and events, therefore, are not the reflection
of something else which lies hidden beneath the surface of things.
It is the ‘surface’ itself that signifies.
As well as a ‘flat’ social replacing ‘society’, the process of social
5ordering itself replaces the traditional model of social order.
Consequently, questions of agency come to the fore and take
precedence over questions of identity, representation and mean-
ing, the characteristic concerns of cultural history. From these
new perspectives on the social, the central questions are not
10about meaning but about action and agency — how these are
mobilized and performed by a vast array of human and non-
human actors (performed through the working out of meanings,
but not by that alone). As Otter remarks, ‘Action is not simply
something humans do: in a collective, action is distributed
15between multiple agents’.47 This notion of the social as a ‘collec-
tive’ of different agencies is helpful, enabling us to differentiate
between the human and the non-human or the animate and the
inanimate, not with respect to their capacities for agency but in
terms of the interactions that exist between them. Although it has
20of course been emphasized in cultural and social history, agency
has tended to be seen from an anthropocentric and humanist
perspective, dwelling on individual and collective actions and
on intention, or, alternatively, has been conceived in highly struc-
ture-like or organic-like ways as manifestations of what is in one
25sense or another hidden below the surface.
Now, these two aspects or strands of inquiry, evident in revi-
sionist social theory, are sometimes complementary, sometimes
contradictory. For instance, agency-centred approaches recog-
nize that human subjects acquire their powers from the powers
30of the networks with which they interact, and so there is an inerad-
icable materiality to human subjectification. However, ‘affect’ in
the form of, say, emotions and memory is not well captured
simply through an understanding of how different agencies inter-
act. At the same time, neither approach is very good for explaining
35inequalities and other differences of access to networks that dif-
ferent parties had — the political economy of agency and affect
47 Otter, ‘From the Social to the Collective’; also Chris Otter, ‘Making Liberalism
Durable: Vision and Civility in the Late Victorian City’, Social Hist., xxvii (2002);
Chris Otter, ‘Cleansing and Clarifying: Technology and Perception in Nineteenth-
Century London’, Jl Brit. Studies, xliii (2004).
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(as it were), something that is always historical.48 Both currents,
while not inherently inimical to history, are not in general marked
by a historical awareness. In the work of Latour, for example, the
accent on contingency and on description as explanation (a reac-
5tion to structure-like understandings of the social) is so marked
that there are no satisfactory accounts of pre-existing formations
of agencies and powers, and of how those relate to newly emer-
ging ones. It has frequently been pointed out that this makes the
relevance of accounts of what actors do theoretically unmanage-
10able, likewise the adequacy of explanations of outcomes.
All this suggests that a third element is necessary: one that is
more historical and more aware of the operations of power, but
which also builds upon the advances of the other two strands of
inquiry.49 One such approach (developing, in fact, in a similar
15intellectual space to the other two)50 is that of ‘governmen-
tality’.51 Governmentality is that area of study, developing in
the wake of Foucault, which is interested in the governance of
conduct in all its forms, especially but not exclusively those of
politics and the state. It recognizes that ‘the social’ is itself to be
20seen as a product of different powers, the drivers of which have
always to be understood historically. These powers, human and
non-human, involve the harnessing of agencies that in turn create
48 For a discussion of the drawbacks and differences of different aspects, see Chris
Otter, ‘Locating Matter: The Place of Materiality in Urban History’, in Bennett and
Joyce (eds.), Material Powers.
49 The influence of historical work itself, and dependence on historical narratives
arising from this work, has, however, been far from absent in the work on affect and
agency in social theory: on the contrary, the history of science and technology and in
turn its impact on science studies has been crucial in opening up the question of the
role of material things and processes in the politics of knowledge (see n. 44 above).
50 For a useful account of the relationships between science studies and sociology,
especially political sociology/governmentality, see John Law, ‘On Sociology and STS’,
Sociol. Rev., lvi (2008).
51 Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne and Nikolas Rose (eds.), Foucault and Political
Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Rationalities of Government (London, 1996);
Rose, Powers of Freedom; Nikolas Rose, Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Private
Self, 2nd edn (London, 1999); Rose, Politics of Life Itself; Mitchell Dean,
Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society (London, 1999); Graham
Burchill, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds.), The Foucault Effect: Studies in
Governmentality (London, 1991); Mike Gane and Terry Johnson (eds.), Foucault’s
New Domains (London, 1993). The pioneering work of Paul Rabinow has been of
fundamental importance for this development, and Rabinow was of course closely
involved with Foucault during Foucault’s time at the University of California,
Berkeley. See for instance, Paul Rabinow, French Modern: Norms and Forms of the
Social Environment (Chicago, 1995).
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rationalities and technologies of power. Particularly in relation to
questions of power and the political, governmentality studies
have drawn very powerfully and substantially upon the other
two currents described above, and developed them further.
5This has also been manifest in the way in which interest in govern-
mentality has taken a decidedly historical turn in recent years,
with historians developing these departures across historical
times and geographical spaces, especially in terms of the history
of the political rationalities and technologies of liberalism.52 In
10Otter’s work on the politics of light and vision, for instance, or in
that of James Vernon on hunger and nutrition, or in my own work
on the city,53 liberal subjectivity is seen to be inconceivable with-
out the agency and the ‘affects’ of urban and pedagogic infra-
structures — such as running water and road paving in the
15cities, an agency itself maintained by armies of engineers, inspec-
tors and manualworkers, and in turn by the multiple agencies that
these engaged. Indeed, in the course of the nineteenth century
modern versions of the ‘social’ in Britain emerged precisely
around questions of the provision of infrastructure and public
20health; while this was particularly so in other rapidly urbanizing
and industrializing states at the time.
As a way of further elucidating these matters, more systematic
attention is now given to some historical works, concentrating on
52 For some of these historical applications, see Alan Hunt, Governing Morals: A
Social History of Moral Regulation (Cambridge, 1999); Matthew G. Hannah,
Governmentality and the Mastery of Territory in Nineteenth-Century America
(Cambridge, 2000); Oleg Kharkhordin, The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A
Study of Practices (Berkeley, 1999); Gyan Prakash, Another Reason: Science and the
Imagination of Modern India (Princeton, 1999); Nicholas B. Dirks, Castes of Mind:
Colonialism and the Making of Modern India (Princeton, 2001); Tony Bennett, The
Birth of the Museum: History, Theory, Politics (London, 1995); Tony Bennett, Pasts
beyond Memory: Evolution, Museums, Colonialism (London, 2004).
53 Chris Otter, The Victorian Eye: A Political History of Light and Vision in Britain,
1800–1910 (Chicago, 2008); James Vernon, Hunger: A Modern History (Cambridge,
Mass., 2007); James Vernon, ‘The Ethics of Hunger and the Assembly of Society: The
Techno-Politics of the School Meal in Modern Britain’, Amer. Hist. Rev., cx (2005).
See also the work of Tom Crook, Francis Dodsworth and Gavin Rand, among others:
Tom Crook, ‘Power, Privacy and Pleasure: Liberalism and the Modern Cubicle’, in
Bennett, Dodsworth and Joyce (eds.), ‘Liberalism, Government and Culture’; Francis
M. Dodsworth, ‘‘‘Civic’’ Police and the Condition of Liberty: The Rationality of
Governance in Eighteenth-Century England’, Social Hist., xxix (2004); Gavin
Rand, ‘Same Difference? Liberalism, Modernity and Governance in the Indian
Empire’, in Simon Gunn and James Vernon (eds.), The Peculiarities of Liberal
Modernity in Britain, Univ. of California Press, forthcoming; Joyce, Rule of Freedom,
particularly chs. 1–2.
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how in particular these have handled the crucially significant cat-
egory of materiality. For it is in understanding the material world
that inherited and often unacknowledged assumptions about the
nature of the social have to a large extent blocked the development
5of cultural and social history. In shifting from a theoretical to a
historical approach, I must emphasize that the works now con-
sidered should not be taken as merely exemplifying the reinter-
pretations of the social considered so far. While there are many
links between them and recent social theory, the former are not to
10be seen as simply exemplifying the latter: the historical works
considered each have their own agendas (such as the agendas
of science studies and those of historical sociology), and, in the
same way, the agendas of social theory have their own intellec-
tual trajectories. Rather, the two bodies of work — theoretical and
15historical — can be seen, at this stage of development anyway, as
providing commentary one upon the other. Certainly, the histor-
ical work shows how it is possible to make up the historical defi-
ciencies evident in many of the theoretical approaches, for
instance in the provision of novel and more capacious accounts
20of historical change, including how pre-existing formations of
agencies and dispositions of powers are transformed into new
ones. By the same token, theoretical perspectives provide new
possibilities for historical work.
In another sense, the works considered here are more clearly
25exemplary, in that in their different empirical ways they bring out
very clearly how theoretical perspectives have a real pay-off for
historical work. Theoretically, the significant development they
share lies in extending the activities of history and the social
sciences into the realm of what — as the ‘natural’, non-human,
30material world — has usually been considered as beyond the
‘social’. I begin with writings at the extraordinarily productive
intersection of history, the sociology of materiality, and science
studies,54 most of it concerning the state, my object of attention in
the next section.
54 See, for example, in the historical sociology area, Chandra Mukerji, Territorial
Ambitions and the Gardens of Versailles (Cambridge, 1997); Chandra Mukerji,
Impossible Engineering: Technology and Territoriality on the Canal Du Midi (Princeton,
2009); Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity
afterWorldWar II (Cambridge, Mass., 1998); James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How
Certain Schemes to Improve the HumanCondition Have Failed (New Haven, 1998), esp.
ch. 1; Richard Biernacki, The Fabrication of Labor: Germany and Britain, 1640–1914
(Berkeley, 1995); and, on Ireland, Patrick Carroll, Science, Culture and Modern State
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First, the fine work of Chandra Mukerji on the seventeenth-
and eighteenth-century French state concerns the ways in which
the power of that state was performed in and through the land of
France itself, literally in terms of the state’s ‘territorialization’.55
5This was apparent both in the fortifications at the periphery and
in the gardens at the centre of the new French state. Territoriali-
zation also took material form in the dispersal of state power into
French products and economic practices, encouraged and devel-
oped by the state, so that France became part of the economic
10landscape itself, the landscape of industrial and rural production
in their everyday forms. Mukerji also considers the crucial role
of major public works, such as the building of canals, in format-
ting in material fashion the powers of the state. However, because
the contrivance of great engineering projects at the time de-
15pended upon the input of many forms of expertise, high and
low, the state was the outcome of the ‘distributed cognition’ of
its many makers.
The result was therefore not merely an expression of state
power from above, but also of state-fashioning in a multi-
20directional way, in which stakes in the state were diverse, and so
the operation of the powers of the state were correspondingly
complex. While it is apparent from this work that the French
state was discursively constituted and experienced, in terms of
practice and materiality it was also, and perhaps mainly, pro-
25duced in ways other than through discursive articulation alone.
Analysing this complexity of outcomes is considerably for-
warded by Mukerji’s distinction between personal and imper-
sonal rule, which she considers in terms of what she calls
‘strategics’ and ‘logistics’. As she puts it, ‘Strategics are efforts
30to organise human relations while logistics are efforts to organise
things’.56 Although they are related they need to be distinguished.
Because it is involved with the natural world, ‘logistics’ requires
a different type of power in which the often unknown and
(n. 54 cont.)
Formation (Berkeley, 2006). Another work that does not, however, share the theore-
tical literacy of the other works cited here is David Blackbourn,TheConquest ofNature:
Water, Landscape and theMaking ofModernGermany (London, 2006). Because of this,
the book is ‘resolutely human and anthropocentric’, as the author puts it (p. 12);
important avenues of inquiry remain unopened.
55 As well as Mukerji’s works cited in n. 54, see also Chandra Mukerji, ‘The
Unintended State’, in Bennett and Joyce (eds.), Material Powers.
56 Mukerji, Impossible Engineering, 214.
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uncontrollable agencies of the natural world have to be accounted
for. Canals leak; roads crumble; pipes burst.
Next, the work of Richard Biernacki has considered how what
he calls the pragmatic form of a symbolic practice may carry
5messages apart from the signs these practices use.57 In particular,
he demonstrates how nineteenth-century German and British
workers received different concepts of labour as a commodity in
the actual process of using their piece-rate scales. Not only in this
dimension of practice, however, but also in the spatial arrange-
10ments of factories in Germany and Britain and in the different
forms of time discipline practised in both countries, contrasting
notions of abstract labour were reproduced over long periods of
time. Biernacki points to how an emphasis on culture in practice
(rather than culture of or for practice) calls on bodily competen-
15cies that have their own structure and co-ordinating influence,
extending beyond purely semantic relations in a sign system.
Seminal work on scientific experimentation in seventeenth-
century Britain long ago established how material objects and
processes (including the body) are the bearers of both knowledge
20and social relations, and therefore of ‘culture’.58 This and subse-
quent work shows how the replication of scientific tests depended
on tacit bodily know-how to make and operate instruments, a
capacity that was lodged in the body and in the hand, and was
represented on paper or in speech only with great difficulty and
25much inadequacy. Forms of understanding were transformed
by a non-verbal enculturation of the body.59 More recent work
in this vein indicates how natural knowledge is embodied and
materialized in different historical forms, including knowledge
seemingly as abstract as mathematical physics.60 In the work of
30Peter Becker and William Clark, the formation of those key fig-
ures of modernity, the bureaucrat and the academic, is seen to be
the outcome of the material forms of the ‘office’, including (and
especially) paperwork and the physical forms of their actual
57 Richard Biernacki, ‘Work and Culture in the Reception of Class Ideologies’, in
John R. Hall (ed.), Reworking Class (Ithaca and London, 1997).
58 As well as Shapin and Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump, see also Christopher
Lawrence and Stephen Shapin (eds.), Science Incarnate: Historical Embodiments of
Natural Knowledge (Chicago, 1998).
59 Steven Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-
Century England (Chicago, 1994).
60 Andrew Warwick, Masters of Theory: Cambridge and the Rise of Mathematical
Physics (Chicago, 2003).
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working environments.61 Similarly, Miles Ogborn’s recent work
on the East India Company demonstrates how, across several
centuries, the material forms and practices of writing embedded
British colonial power.62 Thus, in terms of ‘affect’, historians
5have perhaps as much to teach social scientists as vice-versa.
Parallel to some of these studies — coming from a much more
theoretical and indeed philosophical direction, but having an
empirical purpose, however heterodox — is the innovative work
of Manuel DeLanda.63 This provides what DeLanda calls a ‘non-
10linear’ history of the last millennium, in which matter is brought
directly into historical explanation; his account is shaped by the
ways in which, over the long term, matter and energy have trans-
formed and in turn have been transformed by their passage
through human populations. This reminds us of the significance
15for environmental history of this sort of work, including the pol-
itics of environments, and it links to studies in somewhat different
veins, such as that of Mitchell on the history and politics of carbon
energy.64 DeLanda also makes considerable use of the work of
that very great historian of the material world Fernand Braudel,
20and of others of the Annales School. There is indeed a pleasing
circularity here: what was once the major influence on the old
social history (expressed in part in the aspiration to histoire
totale) might, hopefully, turn out to be a major influence on the
new. There is no doubt that Braudel’s work is of foundational
25significance for the sorts of departure signalled here — but this
will be a Braudel seen in the light of intellectual changes that have
occurred subsequent to his structuralist sensibility.
Although much of the work mentioned so far concerns the
history of power and the political, that of Ken Alder is an espe-
30cially useful way to introduce a more focused consideration of
61 Peter Becker and William Clark, Little Tools of Knowledge: Historical Essays on
Academic and Bureaucratic Practices (Ann Arbor, 2001); see also Peter Becker and
Ru¨diger von Krosigk (eds.), Figures of Authority: Contributions towards a Cultural
History of Governance from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century (Brussels and
Oxford, 2008).
62 Miles Ogborn, Indian Ink: Script and Print in the Making of the English East India
Company (Chicago, 2007).
63 Manuel DeLanda, A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History (New York, 1997);
Manuel DeLanda, A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social
Complexity (London, 2006).
64 Timothy Mitchell, ‘Carbon Democracy’, research paper. My thanks to Timothy
Mitchell for making this paper available to me.
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these aspects.65 Alder’s work concerns the efforts of eighteenth-
century state military engineers in France to produce func-
tionally identical artefacts, for example weaponry of all sorts.
Encountering the resistance of merchants and artisans, military
5engineers defined these artefacts with instruments — technical
drawing and tools — to produce a degree of deliberate and con-
trolled variability. Such ‘manufacturing tolerance’, as Alder
terms it, was then refined by engineers in increasingly rule-
bound ways in order to forestall further subversion. These new
10standards of production arose from the social conflict of the state
with these different groups; and so the standards can be under-
stood as both reproducing and also partially resolving this con-
flict, doing so through material forms which appeared to take on
the nature of ‘objectivity’.
15The creation of ‘manufacturing tolerance’ in the production of
artefacts operated in relation to the emerging political toleration
of the French state for its citizen-producers. In this period, the
state’s rules regarding the invention, production and consump-
tion of artefacts came to be defined in formal terms, rather than in
20terms of particularistic privileges granted on an individual basis.
More generally, economic relationships between the state and its
citizen-producers were henceforth defined in public terms, rather
than as a matter of private law or of the moral obligation of sub-
jects. These developments were of a piece with the emergence of
25manufacturing tolerance as a way to define the boundary between
the state’s need for commodities and the right of its subjects to
make an economic livelihood. The juridically limited state and
the decentralized capitalist order which emerged at the end of the
eighteenth century thus put an end to the particularistic legal
30status which both persons and artefacts had enjoyed for most of
the Ancien Re´gime. As Alder says, we might even conclude that
henceforth objects could in some sense be considered ‘objective’.
It is precisely this ‘engineering in’, and subsequent reproduc-
tion of, culture and social relations in material objects, and vice
35versa (including the forms of ‘truth’ present in notions of appar-
ent objectivity), that is considered in so much of this work. As is
apparent in Alder’s work on the French state and in myown on the
65 Ken Alder, Engineering the Revolution: Arms and Enlightenment in France, 1763–
1815 (Princeton, 1997); Ken Alder, ‘Making Things the Same: Representation,
Tolerance and the End of the Ancien Regime in France’, Social Studies of Science,
xxviii (1998).
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British city — for example in the apparent reality and objectivity
of technical systems which are in fact techno-social systems — it is
clear that this distinction between representation/culture and the
real/material is decidedly a question of power; so the employment
5of the category of the ‘cultural’ solely as representation, and the
history of its emergence as representation, always involves an
understanding of power and indeed very often of the political.
This discussion of the social can be concluded by considering
one particularly valuable deployment of these newer develop-
10ments, especially since (as with Alder, Biernacki and Mukerji) it
draws attention to the economy and the economic, which has
been ignored by cultural historians even more emphatically
than the social. I have in mind Mitchell’s recent Rule of Experts:
Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity. Cultural history has not only
15neglected the economic; it has also, with honourable excep-
tions,66 neglected the state. The great value of this book is that
it plays out in detail — in terms of the history of twentieth-century
colonial and post-colonial Egypt — the argument that ‘the dis-
tinction between the material world and its representations is not
20something that we take as the starting point. It is an opposition that
is made in social practice’.67 In twentieth-century Egypt, ‘The
economy became arguably the most important set of practices
for organizing what appears as the separation of the real world
66 George Steinmetz (ed.), State/Culture: State-Formation after the Cultural Turn
(Ithaca, 1999). There is indeed a new, more ‘cultural’ reading of the economy and
the economic, for instance in the important initiative in the history of consumption of
Frank Trentmann and others, where culture and the economic are seen to be linked.
This is also the case in the new history of economic thought that is also emerging. For
example, Martin Daunton and Frank Trentmann (eds.), Worlds of Political Economy:
Knowledge and Power in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Basingstoke, 2004).
And, of course, there is the considerable literature on the history of work and of class,
represented in the so-called ‘linguistic turn’ of the 1980s and 1990s, which shows
clearly how it is now impossible to write an adequate history of the economic in the
sphere of production without understanding culture. However, much of this literature
is at some considerable distance from the approaches I outline here. On the other
hand, for an important new departure, emanating from the Centre for Research in
Sociocultural Change at Manchester University and the Open University,5http://
www.cresc.ac.uk4, which brings culture and economy together in line with the new
approaches I consider here, see the first number of the Journal of Cultural Economy
(2007).
67 Mitchell,Rule of Experts, 6 (my emphasis); see also p. 5. In addition, see Timothy
Mitchell, ‘Society, Economy, and the State Effect’, in Steinmetz (ed.), State/Culture;
and Michel Callon (ed.), The Laws of the Markets (Oxford, 1998) for an important
theoretical/empirical context for Mitchell’s account of what needs to be in place, in the
human and non-human worlds, for an economy to be ‘fixed’ in position.
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from its representations, of things from their values, of actions
from intentions, of an object world from the realm of ideas’. As
Mitchell concludes, ‘the mechanisms that set up the separation
preceded . . . the separation itself’; hence taking this ‘separation
5as foundational is not the solid ground it so often seems’. And
in earlier work, on the basis of the conditions upon which the
twentieth-century economy was established, Mitchell has ex-
plored the making of modern practices of representation in the
colonial politics of nineteenth-century Egypt.68
10Historical and empirical demonstration and argument is there-
fore one of the great virtues of Mitchell’s book, in which ‘social
theory’ is not distinguished from empirical work but is developed
in terms of it, in an instance of what is here called the´orie concre`te
(Mitchell in fact calls his book a work of ‘social theory’). It is also a
15book steeped in the social theory and empirical practices
described here — for instance actor-network theory and science
studies — yet it wears that theory lightly, with a garb of empirical
demonstration and theory-exploration, so that it (like the other
works considered), speaks directly to historians, given their wide-
20spread anxieties and reticence about ‘theory’. By the same token,
the ahistorical character of much social science work is high-
lighted. All these works demonstrate the unity not only of practice
and theory but also of history and the social sciences, offering
proof that many existing disciplinary and sub-disciplinary dis-
25tinctions are as often as not an impediment to understanding.
III
THE STATE
It will be apparent from the discussion so far that new perspec-
tives on the social have the capacity to radically call in question
30some of our central analytical concepts. One of these, as will also
be evident, is the state (though it is not the only one, and the
traditional concerns of social history, including economy and
class as well as culture, are far from being sidelined by new devel-
opments and indeed become available for rethinking and hence
35renewal). With respect to the state, when it is written about, the
writing still tends to be in the familiar terms of its constitutional
68 Mitchell, Rule of Experts, 5–6; Timothy Mitchell, Colonising Egypt, revised edn
(Berkeley, 1991).
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and administrative manifestations, of its social and economic role
(welfare, economic policy and so on), or of ideas or experiences of
the state. In these understandings the state is decidedly an ‘it’.
Much the same applies in regard to the chief conceptual schools
5of understanding the state. That is so, whether these be the liberal
and pluralist ideas which envisage the state as the autonomous
and neutral regulator of society and of its rights and obligations,
or the Marxist and ‘elite’ notions which see the state as the pro-
jection or instrument of interests and classes.69
10Those different approaches notwithstanding, there does none-
theless seem to be a general consensus about what I have called
the ‘itness’ of the state (despite its variety of historical forms and
its manifold functions). This ontologizing of the state does not
easily survive the critical scrutiny of the positions that I have out-
15lined. Therefore, should we think of the state not as a thing (even
though it is assuredly produced as a reification), but as something
like a site of passage of and between different powers — thinking
here of power in a post-Foucault vein, and including Mukerji’s
distinction between personal and impersonal power, strategics
20and logistics? The accretion or clustering of these systems of
power, or more simply powers, at the level of ‘the state’ since
the sixteenth century and earlier forms a process that in academic
discourse has come to be called the governmentalization of the
state, something that the state may at times drive but of which it is
25very often neither the author nor the master. From a parallel
viewpoint the state might be thought of in terms of relationships,
in particular as a constantly shifting relationship between what we
are used to calling ‘state’ and ‘society’. It is in this vein that
Mitchell, for example, talks of the ‘state effect’, the particular
30configuration of state and society being seen as the outcome of
the transaction of powers which are themselves diversely located
in the social.70
Taking the example of bureaucracy, it has proved productive
to think about the state as a site where bureaucratic power
69 See the useful summary of approaches in Michael Mann, The Sources of Social
Power, ii, The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760–1914 (Cambridge, 1993), ch. 3.
The approach I take in the present article has a certain amount in common with that of
Mann, although the differences should be apparent enough, especially the different
understandings of power, materiality and the social evident here.
70 Mitchell, Rule of Experts, 6.
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congregates or clusters, a site in which this form of power may
neither originate nor terminate. Bureaucratic forms of organiza-
tion, and the powers they call upon and elaborate, emerge in
many places, for example in business, the military, and within
5religious institutions. These then ‘migrate’, as it were, to and
from the state. Clustering there, they are redeployed and multi-
plied, but they may also lodge themselves so firmly as to outlive
the state, or to function in ways that are parasitic upon it and
inimical to it, as for example in some contemporary African
10states.71 So, it might be better to talk not of state power per se
but of bureaucratic power, emphasizing the adjectival over the
nominative. This view has now, in fact, begun to be dominant in
the social sciences, a recent reader in the anthropology of the state
drawing precisely on some of the figures considered here, for
15instance Foucault, Mitchell, James Ferguson and Nikolas Rose.72
Thinking about power in this way is indeed to think of the state
in a ‘relational’ way. However, if the process of analysing the state
through these new means is to progress then it is necessary —
much more than has hitherto been the case — to explore the ways
20in which micro-level pluralities of power do in fact cohere (or fail
to cohere) into new forms and configurations at different levels
and in different ways, such as the ‘bureaucratic power’ that I have
mentioned.73 How then do these powers in turn become stabi-
lized and redeployed to form ‘the state’?74 In a new book in pro-
25gress, The Soul of Leviathan: Political Technologies of the Imperial
British State, I take up these questions in terms of the recognition
71 James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: ‘Development’, Depoliticization, and
Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho (Minneapolis, 1994).
72 Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta (eds.),TheAnthropology of the State: AReader
(Oxford, 2006). For works by Ferguson and Rose, see nn. 15, 51 and 71 above.
73 Foucault himself (together with much of the literature which has followed his
influence) on the one hand uses a conceptual logic that decentres the state, while on
the other he employs the nominative form, ‘the state’. This illustrates the central
difficulty of language in the new approaches I develop here: our reliance in everyday
and academic practice on concepts and terms rooted in the very epistemological and
ontological distinctions that themselves are under scrutiny.
74 The view of the state taken here involves a move away from the traditional notion
in political theory and the philosophy of power as the expression, in the form of the
state, of domination and sovereignty. However, while sovereignty in this sense is rightly
criticized, as what Foucault following Hobbes called ‘the soul of Leviathan’, sover-
eignty itself is still a central question. See Michel Foucault, ‘Lecture Two, 14 January
1976’, in Michel Foucault, ‘SocietyMust Be Defended’: Lectures at the Colle`ge de France,
1975–76, ed. Mauro Bertani, trans. David Macey (Harmondsworth, 2003), 29.
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that the ‘powers’ of which I speak (bureaucratic, pedagological,
military, among others) are always an assemblage of the consti-
tuents that make them up. These constituents involve what might
be called, first, big and little tools of power (and the little ones, like
5the pens, paper and handwriting of offices, not to mention the
physical forms of offices themselves, are of as much historical
importance as the big ones); secondly, practices or techniques like
the self-representations and work practices of bureaucrats; and
finally, rationales of governance such as various ethics of bureau-
10cracy and social leadership more widely, together with the greater
rationale in liberal polities of freedom itself. To understand power
properly, we need indeed to start with these constituents from, as
I say, the ‘bottom up’; though not in the old mould of ‘history
from below’, not working from the micro to the macro, but oper-
15ating multi-directionally as it were, seeking for points of articula-
tion, for the configuration of networks, for points of stabilization,
and also (by the same logic), for points of destabilization and
disarticulation.
In order to make these points less abstract, I now discuss them
20with respect to the nineteenth- and twentieth-century British
state, a state that was inherently imperial in character. In a great
deal of the literature on the Imperial state the emphasis has been
on ‘provincialising’ Europe and its centres of power, and so, cor-
respondingly, on alternative models of empire based on the idea
25of the network and on the recognition of the importance of the
local. However, the logic of the network model is that empire is
central as well as local, and indeed that new understandings of the
‘central’ and the ‘local’ need to be found. The analytic fields
highlighted in this article, in terms of the major theoretical and
30historiographical currents outlined, provide important elements
of a new understanding. The important case of British India can
be briefly considered in terms of the India Office, the institutional
centre of British imperial rule. The fact that it was the institu-
tional ‘centre’ in itself, as constitutionally established, is obvious
35enough; but what is at issue here is what a ‘centre’ is in the first
place. By itself, institutional designation means relatively little;
what matters is how metropole and colony, centre and local — the
multiple actors and networks of empire — were brought into a
qualified degree of stability. That stability was primarily but not
40exclusively produced by the material forms of bureaucracy,
paperwork itself and the material environment of this work in
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the shape of the office:75 in short, what bureaucrats did and what
they did it with, which usually seems to be the last thing that
students of the state consider. In the space available I can do no
more than outline this general question of the place and function-
5ing of ‘centres’ in network-directed understandings of the state.
Formed in 1858, the India Office replaced the governance of
the commercial East India Company.76 It represented a new
phase of colonial intervention in the form of direct political gov-
ernment after the so-called Indian Mutiny of 1857. The materi-
10ality of paper and writing were especially important in India, given
that Indian governance involved governance at a distance, indeed
multiple distances, and so the India Office in London ostensibly
governed all of ‘India’, not only the imperial administration as
it were ‘on the ground’ — earlier in Calcutta and then in Delhi —
15but also the individual political units that made up the complex
political formation that was India (Presidencies, Provinces, and
so on). In India itself there were different governmental and
administrative systems within different administrative levels
and political units of so-called British India, often far removed
20from India Office control or indeed knowledge. These differences
marked the whole edifice of British rule, down to the level of the
individual District Commissioner and indeed that of the village
itself as a political structure. Therefore, the supposedly head
office in London often had relatively little if anything to do with
25the actual day-to-day governance of India.
This should not mislead us: the material powers that bureau-
cracy represented performed the state in such a way that the mate-
rial forms and practices of administration itself (reports, minutes,
the primary tool of the file itself, and so on) served to ‘centre’ the
30imperial state and in the process redistribute power. While there is
much emphasis in the historiography of British India on the dis-
junctions of empire, the constitution of ‘centres’ recalls the basic,
but sometimes lost, question of how the empire could work at all,
in the sense of achieving direction and continuity in the midst of
75 Patrick Joyce, ‘Filing the Raj: Political Technologies of the Imperial British State’,
in Bennett and Joyce (eds.), Material Powers.
76 For recent work on the East India Company, as well as Ogborn, see H. V. Bowen,
The Business of Empire: The East India Company and Imperial Britain, 1756–1833
(Cambridge, 2006); see also the standard works on the India Office: in its policy
formation role, Arnold P. Kaminsky, The India Office, 1880–1910 (London, 1986);
and on its archives, Martin Moir, AGeneral Guide to the India Office Records (London,
1988).
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profound centripetal tendencies. ‘Centres’, to employ a short-
hand term, can be envisaged as not taking only a solely institu-
tional form (though the latter is obviously of importance in
accounts of the state). Other forms are discussed in some of the
5works already considered, where the bureaucratic institution
is not the chief object. That is apparent in Mitchell’s study of
how the governance of the British Empire, and the governance
of colonial Egypt in particular, was predicated on the creation of
‘the economy’ as a bounded, autonomous, systemic and self-
10regulating entity.77 It was a ‘national economy’ — and a founda-
tion for the creation of the ‘modern’ state of Egypt. From another
point of view, Mukerji’s work on seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century France deals with how state power was performed
within the French landscape.78 Thus, in the one case the state
15can be understood to be ‘centred’ in terms of a supposedly unitary
national economy, and in the other in terms of physical territory.
Critical to all these developments was the production of
abstraction. Bureaucratic institutions deal with and themselves
generate the abstractions of administration and governance
20(through the means and in the form of files, etc.). The adminis-
trative systems these make up (for example filing systems) and the
knowledge they produce are in turn related to the way in which,
during the nineteenth century, the state became increasingly
‘technical’. We think of the technical in terms of how the opera-
25tions of power have historically become linked to science and
technology as commonly understood. The development of pro-
cesses of abstraction, objectification and calculation/standardiza-
tion is closely related to the development both of science and
technology and of modern power, especially in the form of the
30state. By ‘technical’ a broader ‘technicization’ of power may
be denoted, present in everyday bureaucratic office technol-
ogies, but also in the very idea of a professional and dedicated
bureaucracy — in which, in Britain in the course of the late eigh-
teenth and early nineteenth centuries, politics and administration
35came to be differentiated, so that administration itself became
‘technical’. In both senses of the technical, the modern state
has come to depend on abstraction as the basis of what in this
77 Mitchell, Rule of Experts, passim.
78 Mukerji, Territorial Ambitions and the Gardens of Versailles; Mukerji, Impossible
Engineering.
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context can only be called its techno-power. For instance, the
ever-increasing capacity to scope, measure and calculate gener-
ated statistically defined populations and things which were in
their nature abstract.
5In this, writing itself was of fundamental and perhaps surprising
importance, in that the quotidian technology of the state during
the period of its great mid to late nineteenth-century emergence
was hand (low rather than high) technology, rather like the devel-
opment of the contemporaneous ‘Industrial Revolution’, which
10in large measure depended on hand power, strength and skill.79
As Ogborn observes of the East India Company factory of the
eighteenth century:
The aim was to construct a controlled space for writing and calculation
which would seek to ensure the accessibility of the books, the orderly
15conduct of accountancy, the absence of the selfish interests of factory
chiefs, and all that depended upon it. Understanding this specific and
small-scale geography of writing and writing practices as an ordering of
the relationships between power and knowledge in the making of global
trade, means recognising the social and cultural relationships that lie right
20at the heart of the economic arrangements of mercantile capital.80
Something similar was evident in the nineteenth-century India
Office, where the writing and calculation that went on in just such
controlled spaces ensured the direction, continuity and perceived
unity of the state. This happened at a systemic level, in terms of
25new paper-based means of the co-ordination of the multiple jur-
isdictions and powers that made up the imperial connection with
India. Examples were uniform cross-institution filing systems,
and increasingly precise and exhaustive archiving systems oper-
ating across and within dispersed geographical entities, both of
30which helped to put in place enduring if always unstable new
information systems. Therefore, the engines of change in terms
of imperial history become the files themselves together with the
often obscure individuals who engineered their continual rein-
vention. It is these things and these people that need to figure in
35new narratives of historical change.81 Government ‘at a distance’
79 On the contemporary acceleration of state development, see C. A. Bayly, The
Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons (Oxford,
2004), esp. ch. 7.
80 Ogborn, Indian Ink, ***.
81 Joyce, ‘Filing the Raj’; also Patrick Joyce, ‘Postal Communication and the
Making of the British Technostate’, Centre for Research in Sociocultural Change,
working paper, no. 54 (Aug. 2008), online at5http://www.cresc.ac.uk/publications/
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in British India in turn invokes the idea, present in the work of
Latour and others, of ‘action at a distance’. Material objects and
processes, for example ‘immutable mobiles’ such as navigation
devices and maps (not to mention files, forms and reports), serve
5to co-ordinate and command dispersed entities, making them
objects and sometimes instruments of governance. In this way,
‘centres’ can be understood as what Latour calls ‘centres of cal-
culation’. Empire is one obvious entity that is always dispersed in
this way, and so we can speak not only in familiar fashion of a
10‘Paper Raj’, but also in a much more radical sense of a whole
paper empire.
Operating on a systemic level, bureaucratic materialities served
to fabricate the institution of bureaucracy itself, and to produce
the ‘affect’ of the bureaucrat. Again, a similar process to that of
15the East India Company is evident, except that now the state itself
rather than capitalism came to the forefront. Ogborn notes:
It is also the case that if the ‘logic’ of capital was felt by those engaged
in these forms of exchange as a ‘logic’ — as an impersonal, inexorable,
and determining force — then that was exactly the effect achieved by
20the separations, hierarchies, and controls instituted in the factories’ writ-
ing offices as the sites of local practices of abstraction and stan-
dardisation performed upon chains and compilations of inscriptions
and reinscriptions . . . It was within these restricted public spaces, and
only within them, that the English East India Company could turn their
25concerns into an objective and controlling profit-seeking force external to
their servants’ private interests, into the ‘logic’ of capital.82
As well as the logic of capital, there was in the nineteenth century
the ‘logic’ of the state and bureaucracy, a logic that gradually
became equally powerful, and was also experienced (to varying
30degrees, of course) as ‘impersonal, inexorable, and determining’.
Ogborn does well to abbreviate ‘logic’, for what is involved here is
not some overweening, transhistorical logic, either of capital or
the state, but more the operation of different logics of practice —
if logic is still not too strong a word. What is involved are
35embedded patterns of practice driven by the exigencies of their
own operation, in which the ‘material’ and the ‘cultural’ are one.
Such logics were highly qualified in their operation, unstable and
(n. 81 cont.)
papers.html4. Here I analyse the new postal systems that were central to the commu-
nications revolution of the time, of which bureaucracy was one expression.
82 Ogborn, Indian Ink, ***.
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anything but inevitable. They are as much apparent in the
seventeenth-century French state (in the ‘impossible engineer-
ing’ of the French canal system, for instance) as in the nineteenth-
century British one; in both countries they led to new state forms
5and new perceptions of the state around the emerging figure of
the proto-technocrat and his form of knowledge.83
The constitution of ‘centres’ worked at a symbolic as well as at a
systemic level, however, anchoring the state in the new bureau-
cracy and consecrating it in a new fashion. One major aspect of
10this was the symbolic performance of the India Office itself, with
respect to the different ‘publics’ involved in Britain, India and the
Empire. Equally, performance was directed to bureaucrats them-
selves, in the twin senses of how they might govern others and also
how they might govern themselves in order to govern others. In
15previous work I have begun to examine how the new administra-
tive regime of the British state consequent on the reforms at mid
century (themselves pioneered in East India Company days) ush-
ered in the performance of transparency and ‘publicity’ by various
means, particularly the form of the examination for different
20grades of the civil service.84
The abstract and the technical are in turn also closely linked to
the means by which unity, legitimacy and authority were attrib-
uted to an overarching ‘state’, an entity which was in fact often a
highly dispersed set of practices of government. Therefore, the
25‘state’ in its modern sense became increasingly possible to envis-
age, and to act upon (and indeed against), as it became increas-
ingly technical and abstract. This is precisely the point pursued in
Mitchell’s work, where the naturalization of the technical is seen
as central to the naturalization of the state, precisely in the form of
30the state as a unified totality. In ‘the rule of experts’, power took
on the ‘delegated’, dispersed and hidden form of the technical —
in experts, in their expertise, and in their techniques and technol-
ogies. In the realm of administration the reformed bureaucracy of
nineteenth-century Britain represented just such a rule.
83 Mukerji, ‘Unintended State’; Penny Harvey and Hannah Knox, ‘Abstraction,
Materiality and the ‘‘Science of the Concrete’’ in Engineering Practice’, in Bennett
and Joyce (eds.), Material Powers.
84 Joyce, Rule of Freedom, chs. 2–3.
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IV
CONCLUSION
Ju¨rgen Kocka describes what distinguishes social historians from
other kinds of historian as follows: amongst other things,
5They reject all forms of strict methodological individualism. They are not
primarily interested in single biographies and specific events, but rather in
collective phenomena. They try to reconstruct ‘the social’ including social
inequality. They do not accept that the past can sufficiently be understood
as a context of perceptions, experiences, discourses, actions and mean-
10ings, alone. They insist that conditions and consequences, structures and
processes have to be taken seriously and brought back in. They try to
combine understanding and explanation.85
With all this we can agree: there is an essential continuity to social
history. At the same time, however, it is equally true that every one
15of the categories listed by Kocka stands in need of rethinking.
This rethinking need not, of course, be in the shape of the theo-
retical influences mentioned here — but whether any successful
refiguring of the social in social history can take place without
serious engagement with them is doubtful. The means of rethink-
20ing the social have also been described in the light of what has
been called here the ‘theoretical imagination’. That involves a
critical engagement with theory, a critical engagement of history
with other disciplines, and especially a new alignment with the
social sciences, which have been largely lost to view with the rise of
25cultural history (in the 1970s, history, if not quite the ‘queen of
the human sciences’ which it was for the Annales School, had a
degree of power in the social sciences which it has subsequently
lost).
What have not been taken up so far are the references in the
30introduction to politics and the political, and to how the ‘old’
social history for all its problems carried a political charge. In
many ways it did that precisely because it was theoretically engaged
and challenging, its aim being to renovate the house of history,
challenging theoretical foundations which were (as they always
35are), linked to political foundations.86 The same can be said for
the emphasis here upon what is called the theoretical imagination.
It too has the capacity to re-engage with the political in part
through a recognition that power and the political are embedded
85 Kocka, ‘Losses, Gains and Opportunities’, 28.
86 Patrick Joyce, ‘The Return of History: Postmodernism and the Politics of
Academic History in Britain’, Past and Present, no. 158 (Feb. 1998).
208 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 205
K:/Journals/Inprocess/Oup/Pastj/gtp030.3d [13.10.2009–9:29am] [175–
210] Paper: gtp030
MANUSCRIPT CATEGORY: ORIGINAL PAPER
in theoretical, disciplinary and historiographical dispositions
themselves. Therefore, the kind of theoretical awareness advo-
cated here is no less central to the idea of a critical history than the
old social theory present in a former social history was. But, as has
5been seen, the nature of the theoretical has itself changed over the
period, because of the turn to the concrete, to description, and to
the local, and away from the developmental, the grand historical,
and the politically prescriptive.
However, the theoretical positions I outline frequently carry a
10message more directly political than that of a theory-aware critical
history alone,87 so that there is in them, as there could be in a
revived social history, a direct connection between the politics of
the present and the politics of academic, intellectual activity.88
Now, this political message — born out of the engagement of
15contemporary social science with the emerging realities of
contemporary society over the last few decades — will not be
congenial to everyone: its political agendas are broadly post-
individualist and post-human, and do not sit well with many
currently obtaining notions of the social. However, as the great
20governing political and historical narratives of the 1960s and
1970s have been displaced by a much more fluid and changing
political and economic world, new sorts of politics as well as of
academic theory and practice become necessary to engage with
this new world. It would therefore appear necessary that social
25history engage no less with the politics than with the theory of new
positions.
During the years since the 1960s and 1970s, the ‘political’ itself
came in important measure to be redefined in identity terms, with
cultural history itself (particularly in the USA) being closely
30linked to a politics which was and to some extent still is identity
politics, especially the politics of race and gender. The political
situation of these years likewise produced the context in which
87 For the example of science and technology studies, see John Law on what he calls
ontological politics, in his ‘Sociology and STS’, and see also the introduction to this
special centenary anniversary number of the Sociological Review. The field of govern-
mentality studies is itself surely indispensable to the elaboration of political positions, a
concern with how we are governed being a necessary precursor to understanding how
we might be better governed. This is especially so in the governance of and through
freedom that marks liberal societies.
88 For example, Thrift’s theoretical approach, outlined above, is avowedly political,
as is that of Latour, for which see, for example, Bruno Latour and Peter Weibel (eds.),
Making Things Public: Atmospheres of Democracy (Cambridge, Mass., 2005).
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academic identity itself, to some extent, took on a political and
ethical character, so that political identities came to be expressed
in academic life itself, in the character of being an academic, and
in the practising of a discipline as such.89 But today we are moving
5towards a new political dispensation, in which the politics of iden-
tity may have less force, and the fate of capitalism and liberalism
more. In the light of a collapsed world economy and an endan-
gered planetary ecology, and in the light also of the re-engineering
of the interface of the natural and the social apparent in modern
10science, the writing of history seems itself to be in the process of
change, moving beyond the employment of history in order to
find out who we are and who we might be, and towards something
else. The cultural turn has indeed turned, and there is no going
back (the much talked-about end of the cultural turn is to this
15extent a misnomer, for we are still in it). The something else
that historical writing is moving towards is unclear, although it
will probably not be the same thing as that learning from history
which marked a good deal of the old social history. Nonetheless,
as has been said, the old social history provides an invaluable
20legacy. However, the argument here is that justice cannot be
done to this legacy unless we continually pose the question
‘What is the social?’.
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89 Patrick Joyce, ‘The Gift of the Past: Towards a Critical History’, in Keith Jenkins,
Sue Morgan and Alun Munslow (eds.), Manifestos for History (London, 2007). The
position developed here is one of a number of Foucault-influenced notions of ‘critical
history’ in the book (see especially the contributions by Joan Scott, ‘History-Writing as
Critique’, and Dipesh Chakrabarthy, ‘History and the Politics of Recognition’; also
Hayden White’s ‘Afterword’). In this afterword, White lines up the post-Foucauldian
critics on one side and the philosophically narrativist critics on the other, adjudicating
in favour of the poetic route to a critical history rather than the theoretical. While I have
nothing against poetic routes as such, in the light of current political circumstances the
limitations of the philosophically and politically naive narrativist route seem apparent.
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